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Abstract Aggregators are platforms that also control a

marketplace for the suppliers’ innovations. Suppliers competing
within aggregators are limited by the technology and governance
rules of the platform owner. As a consequence, aggregators
influence the type and complexity of competitive moves
suppliers can implement. Our research investigates the drivers of
suppliers’ competitive advantage. We incorporate existing
literature on competitive action to identify the categories of
moves available to suppliers. Furthermore, we identify three
types of orthogonal moves that are unique to competition within
aggregators. Finally, we illustrate our advanced categorization in
the context of a major food delivery platform. Our preliminary
results confirm that suppliers, while bounded to resources
exposed by the aggregator, have the opportunity to implement
an heterogenous portfolio of moves in their pursuit of
competitive advantage. This result calls for empirical research in
the context of competition within aggregators in general, and
food delivery platforms specifically.
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1

Introduction

Over the last 30 years technology platforms have emerged as critical elements of all
technological layers (e.g., operating systems, browsers) and in several application
domains (e.g., payments, game development). Aggregators, a type of platform, are
increasingly drawing research, media and regulatory attention. Aggregators (1)
mediate the relationship between customers and suppliers 1 by managing a
marketplace; (2) serve customers at virtually zero marginal costs; (3) exhibit positive
cross-side network effects. Examples include Google Search, Amazon Marketplace,
Apple iOS, TripAdvisor, Expedia, and Deliveroo. Aggregators rise to prominence
by creating superior value for customers. Consider Google Search and the
aggregation of demand for online information seeking. As the number of Web pages
increased exponentially, the precision of the Google’s page-rank algorithm enabled
the firm to provide better answers to customer search queries. Google became the
de-facto organizer of information on the Web, a valuable service for customers.
Whether it is the search for information, the procurement of travel, or the ordering
of food, aggregators come to own customer relationships by providing a superior
solution to a customer “job to be done” (Ulwick 2002).
The competitive performance of aggregators have received significant attention (see
for a review: Mcintyre and Srinivasan 2017; de Reuver et al. 2018). However, we
have yet to fully understand how suppliers can successfully compete within
aggregators, given the idiosyncrasies they present. First, aggregators create synthetic
algorithmic marketplaces that are not bounded by the limitations of the physical
world. Being algorithmic, the competitive rules within aggregators can evolve
arbitrarily and unpredictably. Second, aggregators mediate the interaction between
suppliers and their customers. Unlike the traditional supply-retail relationship,
aggregators (e.g., Expedia) intermediate the relationship between suppliers (e.g.,
hotels) and their customers (e.g., travelers). Because of this characteristic, they are a
special case of platforms (see below), in which suppliers are limited by the
competitive moves afforded by the aggregators. Third, the algorithmic mediation
and the matching mechanisms implemented by aggregators exert pressure toward
the commoditization of suppliers. Having to comply with the aggregators’
technological prerequisites and governance rules, while being unable to own the
1 Suppliers as those organizations that leverage the platform resources to produce digital innovations (i.e., new
market offerings, business processes, or models).
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transactional relationship with their customers creates obstacles to competitive
differentiation by suppliers.
We offer three contributions to the literature. First, we advance a conceptualization
of aggregators as a special type of platforms. Second, we identify the classes of
competitive actions that suppliers can deploy when competing within aggregators,
introducing the notion of platform moves, marketplace moves and outside moves.
Finally, we illustrate the above categorization in the context of digital food delivery
aggregators. The work is important because the vast majority of constituencies for
our research are suppliers and, as aggregators gain prominence, these firms must
find ways to compete within their synthetic algorithmic marketplaces.
2

Definitions

2.1

Platforms

We adopt an information systems perspective, defining platforms as a sociotechnical systems with a layered architecture that facilitates digital innovation by
suppliers through the exposure of digital resources (Parker et al. 2017; Rodriguez
and Piccoli 2020). Digital innovation is “the creation of market offerings, business
processes, or models that result from the use of digital technology.” (Nambisan et
al. 2017, p. 224) Platforms are structurally different from traditional applications
because they provide generic resources that heterogeneous supplier communities
can leverage and combine to produce their digital innovations (Gawer 2014; Hanseth
and Lyytinen 2010). The degree to which a platform enables digital innovation is a
function of its “generativity” (Zittrain 2005). We observe different levels of
generativity as platforms can diverge in the breath of possible uses, and in the degree
to which they facilitate the achievement of desirable objectives. Consider the
example of the Windows .NET software development platform. .NET facilitates the
development of a broad range of software applications. However, due to its general
design, .NET requires significant efforts to develop complex applications in specific
domains (e.g., games). On the other hand, the Unity game development platform
facilitates the achievement of highly complex, yet narrow, objectives that would be
hard to realize by independent game developers using general software development
platforms.
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2.2

Marketplaces

Economist commonly refer to the entity that facilitates the transaction in two-sided
or multi-sided markets as the platform sponsor or owner (Eisenmann et al. 2009).
Much previous research uses the terms market, marketplace, and platform
interchangeably. The concepts are related, but distinct. A market is a specified
category of potential buyers, like readers in the market for books. A marketplace
(e.g., the Amazon Marketplace) is the space, increasingly digital, where people meet
for the purpose of trade. It facilitates the exchange of products, services, and
information between buyers and sellers (Pavlou and Gefen 2004).
The recent success of the AppStore and Google Play demonstrates how ownership
of a marketplace can be a source of competitive advantage for platform owners.
However, it is not a defining prerequisite for a platform to own a marketplace.
Windows, the first dominant software platform, did not integrate a marketplace and
suppliers were free to distribute their innovation (software applications)
independently – some chose OEM partnerships, some retailers, some used mail
order or, after the commercialization of the Internet, direct downloads. Marketplaces
differ in the degree of control exerted by the owner. In some cases, like Apple, the
DRM module in the iOS kernel guarantees full control over the distribution channel
of apps through the AppStore (unless the device is jailbroken). In others, like
Android, the same platform may host multiple competing marketplaces for the
suppliers’ digital innovations (Karhu et al. 2018).
Marketplace owners determine the technological prerequisites and governance rules
for participation (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2015). Where marketplace
participants can adopt opportunistic behaviors, the owner also functions as an
enabler of trust by protecting customers (e.g., by granting favorable refund policies)
or reducing information asymmetry (e.g., by implementing rating systems) (Pavlou
and Gefen 2004). Finally, through the implementation of discovery features, such as
search functionalities, filtering functionalities, and recommendation systems,
marketplace owners impact the value capture potential of all parties (Li et al. 2018).
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Aggregators

An aggregator is a type of platform that integrates a marketplace. It facilitates digital
innovations (like platforms) and transactions between suppliers and customers (like
marketplaces). Aggregators have three defining characteristics: First, they mediate
the relationship between customers (e.g., consumers) and sellers (i.e., suppliers) via
synthetic algorithmic marketplaces. Suppliers are incentivized or required to
distribute their innovation in the aggregator’s own marketplace.
Second, aggregators can serve customers at virtually zero marginal costs.
Aggregators standardize interactions between customers and suppliers, thereby
reducing the complexity, and cost, of managing transactions. For example, the
ordering and fulfillment process in a food delivery aggregator is standardized for all
participating restaurants. Membership in the aggregator’s platform and marketplace
implies respect of technological prerequisites and governance rules by suppliers,
rules that are typically algorithmically enforced. This process of adjustment is
inherently commoditizing, as it leads to an increase in the comparability of suppliers,
and a reduction in the options they have for differentiating their offer.
Third, aggregators exhibit positive cross-side network effects (Katz and Shapiro
1994) because their value creation potential depends on aggregating demand on the
customer side and aggregating a range of suppliers on the supply side. Such network
effects often engender winner-take-all dynamics leading successful aggregators to
command monopolistic positions that force suppliers to join.
3

Competing in Aggregators

The premise of this study is that the emergence of aggregators significantly
influences the competitive actions available to suppliers. Unlike traditional
marketplaces, organizations that participate in aggregators are impacted by digital
technology in two ways. First, they are limited in the extent to which they can
innovate by the degree of generativity of the platform they chose. Second, they are
bound by the algorithmically enforced marketplace governance rules. It is within
these limitations that suppliers craft their competitive actions.
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3.1

Competitive Actions

Organizations compete by a series of actions designed to recombine resources in the
pursuit of improved performance (Henfridsson et al. 2018). A competitive action is
“any externally oriented, specific, observable competitive move initiated by a firm to
enhance its relative competitive position” (Smith et al. 2001, p. 12). In the IS
tradition, competitive actions are enacted through initiatives that depend on the use
of digital technologies at their core (Piccoli and Ives 2005). Previous studies have
grouped competitive actions into pricing, marketing/promotional, product, product
presentation, payment, capacity/scale, service, and operations moves (Ferrier et al.
1999; Li et al. 2019; Yu and Cannella Jr 2007). These studies assume that the
competitive environment complexity and dynamics are general features of the
industry. However, when firms compete within aggregators, they are subject to the
idiosyncratic dynamics explicitly determined by the aggregator (Kapoor and Agarwal
2017). Therefore, suppliers that participate in an aggregator can be subject to
different competitive dynamics with respect to that of the industry. To account for
this specificity, we add an orthogonal set of three classes of competitive action types
that are unique to competition within aggregators: platform actions, marketplace
actions and outside actions.
−

−

Platform actions are moves the suppliers enact to create their digital
innovation by leveraging the generic digital resources exposed by the
platform (Henfridsson et al. 2018). More generative platforms afford higher
optionality, and thus provide the suppliers with a wider array of competitive
actions. When exploiting platform actions, suppliers seek to create synergy
between their innovation and the platform in order to improve their
competitive advantage versus other suppliers (Cennamo et al. 2018; Tiwana
2018).
Marketplace actions are moves the suppliers enact to improve their visibility
by influencing the filtering, search, and/or the algorithmic dynamics created
by the aggregator. As aggregators scale, and competition between suppliers
increases, it becomes of critical importance for suppliers to achieve superior
visibility in the marketplace. As customers face high search costs when
browsing through a larger number of supplier offerings, superior visibility
offers a competitive advantage by improving the probability that customers
will find and transact with a supplier (Carare 2012; Li et al. 2018).
Furthermore, visibility is particularly important in aggregators, as most
exhibit a Pareto distribution, where a small number of suppliers capture the
majority of transactions (Garg and Telang 2013).
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Outside actions are competitive moves the suppliers enact independently of
the aggregator’s platform resources. They do not leverage any platform or
marketplace functionalities. Outside actions can lead to significant
competitive advantage, as they offer suppliers the opportunity to implement
moves with high degree of differentiation potential. Outside actions
therefore tend to depend on the general ecosystem and industry conditions,
instead of the characteristics of the aggregator. However, outside actions
are not insulated from the aggregator’s influence, exerted through
contractual or algorithmically enforced governance and technical rules. For
example, until 2015, Booking.com prevented hoteliers to offer lower prices
in competing distribution channels, including the hotel’s own website. To
limit fraud, Amazon’s algorithms trigger account reviews when a seller
experience sudden increases in the number and dollar amount of their
monthly transactions. As a side effect, such triggers limit the use and
effectiveness of aggressive marketing campaign outside of the Amazon
marketplace.

Digital food delivery platforms are emerging examples of aggregators, where
competition between and within aggregators is evolving rapidly. In the remainder of
this paper we use the case of the dominant European player to demonstrate and
categorize competitive actions by suppliers (i.e., restaurants).
4

The Case of Deliveroo

Founded in London in 2013, Deliveroo facilitates the implementation of food
delivery by restaurants that would otherwise lack such service. The firm rapid growth
has positioned it as one of the major food delivery aggregators in Europe. With more
than 5,000 employees it generated over $300 millions in revenue in 2019. The
Deliveroo platform exposes a number of digital resources enabling restaurants’
delivery services. Examples include menu configuration tools, order and payment
acceptance, and a large network of riders. These resources are accessible to suppliers
via a dashboard or through a set of APIs that can integrate with restaurants existing
Point of Sale systems (POS). Deliveroo is an aggregator, because its platform
integrates a marketplace where diners (customers) can browse through all the
restaurant offerings (suppliers). In the UK the number of restaurants delivering to
any given location varies between ten and 800. Thus, where the number of
restaurants is significant, discovery becomes critical to guarantee relevance.
Deliveroo offers filters and search functionalities to navigate through available
offerings. Moreover, it implements an algorithmic recommendation system that
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ranks restaurants in real-time depending on the probability that customers will place
an order to each restaurant.
4.1

Methods

We selected the case based on two criteria. First, the emergence of food delivery
platforms has intensified competition and disrupted long established competitive
dynamics in the restaurant industry. Second, Deliveroo is at the forefront of
technological innovation in the establishment of advanced platform resources (e.g.,
restaurant partner API), and sophisticated algorithmic marketplace dynamics
governance rules (e.g., predictive restaurant ranking). We followed an iterative
approach for categorizing the competitive actions restaurants can enact in
Deliveroo. The list is compiled based on unstructured interviews with restaurateurs,
the authors’ analysis of Deliveroo’s technology, and from public sources, such as
media reports and Deliveroo’s documentation. Each competitive action identified
was individually coded by the two authors into one action category and type. Action
categories are identified from previous competitive dynamic literature, while actions
types are our proposed orthogonal classification. In case of disagreements, the
coders discussed the coding until 100 percent agreement was achieved.
4.2

Case Findings

We identified 24 competitive actions (see Table 1) that restaurants can implement
for improving their performance within the aggregator. Our exploratory case
analysis provides interesting findings. First, our categorization shows how the
majority of platform-based actions available to suppliers in food delivery aggregators
(15/24) are designed to facilitate the commercialization of the restaurant’s already
existing offerings, through product presentation, service, and marketing moves. The
aggregator affords only two actions in the product category, that simply include the
introduction or removal of a new menu items or their modifiers. Therefore, given
the available menu items, restaurants can differentiate their offerings by curating the
presentation of the items or by improving their service levels (e.g., low delivery
times).
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Second, the vast majority of actions we identified are platform-based (16/24).
Despite the strategic importance of visibility and discoverability in the Deliveroo
marketplace, restaurants only have limited functionalities available to directly impact
them. Instead, the visibility is indirectly determined by a combination of platformbased (e.g., percentage of menu items with images) and outside actions (e.g., delivery
times), and is determined algorithmically by Deliveroo. Therefore, superior visibility
can only be achieved by those restaurants that recognize the importance and pursue
the implementation of those indirect factors that influence their visibility.
Finally, we find that Deliveroo does not facilitate the implementation of competitive
moves in all categories. Although this is not unexpected, we find that restaurants can
circumvent this limitation by implementing outside moves in the capability and
scale/operations categories. However, for the payment’s category, Deliveroo
inhibits the implementation of any competitive actions by fully controlling the
payment process. Furthermore, the absence of any platform-based action in the
capacity and scale categories indicates a well-defined separation between the
restaurants’ internal operations and the aggregator.
5

Discussion

Our analysis of Deliveroo shows that to compete within aggregators, suppliers
deploy a range of competitive moves aimed at performance improvements. As a
consequence, different competitive move configurations can account for
heterogeneous organizational performances. In particular, our orthogonal
classification of competitive actions offers a new viewpoint for analyzing the
strategic potential and effects of competitive actions in the context of aggregators.
As competitive moves exhibit varying levels of complexity, suppliers can implement
barriers aimed at preempting imitation.
Our analysis suggests that the products or service characteristics might influence the
type of competitive actions available to suppliers competing within aggregators. For
example, when the product is digital rather than physical, it is easier for aggregators
to facilitate the development of new products at scale. Instead, when the product is
physical (e.g., a household appliance), the aggregator might focus on facilitating
product presentation or service action categories. However, through the process of
“infrastructuring” (Constantinides et al. 2018), aggregators can extend their reach
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and scope into the physical domain. Deliveroo recently started experimenting with
“cloud kitchens,” by allowing restaurants to increase their capacity and scale by
renting delivery-only optimized kitchens to them.
The increasing control of the marketplace visibility by recommender systems
demands the development of new dynamic capabilities by suppliers. Achieving a
visibility advantage requires continuous sensing and adaptation by suppliers, as the
aggregators’ algorithms are often proprietary and constantly evolving. For example,
Deliveroo recently started promoting those restaurants that use recyclable packaging
materials. Quickly adjusting to this requirement with the appropriate outside moves,
improves a supplier’s visibility. Furthermore, when direct (e.g., ads) and indirect
actions (e.g., time of delivery) for impacting visibility are available, suppliers need to
optimize their combination to achieve maximum visibility.
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Table 1: Competitive actions available in Deliveroo
Category
Product: Launch new products
or modify existing ones.

Price: Implement price cuts and
sales incentives.
Product presentation: Improve
the product information
provided to customers.

Service: Change the company’s
range or level of services
provided to customers.

Service/Operations
Marketing: Perform advertising
and promotions activities.

Capacity and Scale: Change the
company’s capacity or output.
Capacity and Scale/Operations:
Change in organizational
activity systems
Payment: Provide customers
with multiple payment options

Competitive Action
Add or remove a new menu item.
Add or remove modifiers for an item (e.g.,
remove/add ingredient).
Change food packaging to improve quality.
Change the price of a menu item/modifier.
Launch discount, meal deals, or bundles.
Add/change a menu item description.
Add/change a menu item image.
Change the items order in the menu.
Add/modify the menu categories (e.g., starters,
mains).
Change the opening hours on the delivery
platform.
Receive reservations (pre-orders) outside the
restaurants’ opening times.
Set the delivery times (only for restaurant that
manage their own fleet).
Activate “busy mode” to increase the normal
delivery times.
Turn-off the delivery service.
Mark menu items as unavailable.
Decrease/increase delivery times.
Manage own delivery riders’ fleet.
Add/change food category items used as filters
to discover the restaurant.
Create a brand page on the delivery platform.
Launch a virtual brand, that exists only on the
delivery platform.
Launch promotions increasing traffic to the
delivery platform.
Open a “dark kitchen,” optimized for delivery,
and that has no access to the public.
Increase the kitchen capacity, and/or assign
dedicated staff members to fulfill delivery order.
Dedicate front-end staff to manage relationship
with delivery riders.
None.

Type
Platform
Platform
Outside
Platform
Marketplac
e
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Platform
Outside
Platform
Marketplac
e
Platform
Platform
Outside
Outside
Outside
Outside
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6

Limitations and future research

Supplier’s appropriation of value within aggregators presents many idiosyncrasies
that warrant future research attention to fill gaps in our understanding of
competition in increasingly digital markets. We contribute to the body of knowledge
on platforms and marketplaces by identifying three different types of competitive
actions that suppliers can implement when competing within aggregators. However,
our initial findings require the analysis of multiple aggregators within and across
different industries before the external validity of our categorization is established.
Future research should use our initial categorization to empirically investigate those
competitive configurations that lead to superior performance of suppliers competing
within aggregators. The identification of the three different types of competitive
actions (i.e., platform, marketplace, outside) demands empirical investigations to
determine possible differences in their relative effectiveness for short and long-term
competitive position. Finally, the investigation of visibility as a source of competitive
advantage has yet to receive significant attention and focused empirical attention in
this area is needed.
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